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Korea has undoubtedly developed one of the most dynamic economies in the world.
Having realized a successful industrialization, Korea now faces formidable challenges
in science and technology. Korea has the problems of meeting competition from
countries with more efficient industries as well as those with lower labor costs. Korea
must muster the human capital, as well as financial and other resources for domestic
R&D to maintain a continued industrial growth path, complemented by imported
technology. Korea has to promote its own technological innovation with R&D efforts
that are essential in meeting the constraints imposed on it in the changing global
economy. This paper discusses the profound impact of science and technology on
Korea’s economy, as well as its implication for the global economy. 
INTRODUCTION
Patterns of international trade and competition have been changing
dramatically in recent years, with serious consequences for economic policy
and business strategy. These changes are especially important for those
countries searching out strategies for promoting trade-technological
cooperation.
Regarding science and technology’s impact on the economy in the past,
Korean industrialization pushed both workers and management along a
learning curve, resulting in economies of scale of capital goods and
increased levels of human capital. On this foundation, Korea has now
shaped its industries to meet international competition, and it finds itself in
a constantly changing spectrum of industries in various stages of
development. Its industrialization integrated international product cycles
into production-export policy so as to realize dynamic comparative
advantages by mixing endogenous inputs with imported capital goods. 
Korea’s industrial policy has shifted from the promotion of strategic
industry to that of innovation-related activities. In the 1960s and 1970s,
special incentives—tax exemptions, custom rebates, access to foreign
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exchange, etc.—were granted to these strategic industries. Korea’s
technology1 and R&D policy have had both direct and indirect effects on the
economic development process. Government has created a climate
conducive to enhancing science and technology.
Since the 1980s, Korea has built up considerable technological capability
through continued expansion of investment in indigenous R&D and
imported technology. There were also improvements in communication
facilities and increased adaptation and use of technology similar to that of
advanced industrial countries (AICs). As AICs moved to higher
technological levels, Korea’s technology was not simply bought from AICs,
but emerged from careful domestic support networks of indigenous
technology that were developed at the same time. 
The major feature of the Korean technological path was the fostering of
indigenous technology through research centers established in both the
public and private sectors. Korea has picked up existing machinery and
technology at bargain prices. It has also established its own R&D institutes,
which have brought together scientists and engineers to work on common
problems with efficient utilization of research facilities. This is a significant
shift from the past, in which the majority of attention was paid to labor. 
Korea has to undertake a new technology policy to cope with the
challenge imposed upon it under the changing world situation. With the
world economy becoming both globalized and regionalized, and with the
changing technology policy in AICs, Korea has to adjust to the new
situation and must reformulate its technology policy and promote its
technical cooperation with AICs. In a relatively short span of time, Korea
has become one of the most industrialized nations in the world. It is the
world’s 11th-largest  GNP economy, the 12th-largest trading nation, and its
per-capita income in 1995 was $10,000.2
This paper discusses the profound impact of technology on Korea’s
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1 Due to the geopolitics of the Cold War, Korea became one of the biggest recipients of US
technical assistance. The US has built Korea’s technological competence since the early 1950s.
The American military local procurement program also offered opportunities to local
manufactures to learn-by-doing so as to meet product specifications. Korea has relatively easy
access to the technologies of Japan and the United States as the most important sources of
imported technology. See The World Bank, World Development Report 1991 (Washington, D.C.:
The World Bank, 1991), p. 12.
2 It took the U.K. 58 years to double its output per worker, the U.S. 47 years, and Japan 34
years. However, Korea only took 11 years. The reason for this is technological progress;
Technology is far more transferable today than at anytime in history. Korea’s catch-up was
easier than for the technological leaders, since Korea has relatively easy access to technology
introduced by AICs. See, p. 12.
economy as well as its implications for the global economy: 1) restrictions
expected from World Trade Organization (WTO) membership; 2)
intellectual property and copyright issues; 3) moving trade to high-tech
items; 4) dual-use technology and third party transfers; 5) exporting
industries abroad, especially to China. 
RESTRICTIONS EXPECTED FROM WTO MEMBERSHIP 
Technology is spread among nations about as unevenly as physical capital
and human capital. The international technology market is typically
oligopolistic and imperfect, and technology is the accumulated knowledge,
skills, and techniques that are incorporated into the production function. It
is posited to be the foundation of economic development, and it is
associated with the scientific base and education of a country. Technology
raises the marginal productivity of labor as well as that of capital.
Technology mastery is the effective use of technological knowledge, through
continuing technological efforts to assimilate, adapt, and create technology
as well as to improve engineering. 
While some technologies are available at low cost, many are expensive
and subject to tight control. In addition, the ability to make use of imported
technology depends on a country’s absorptive capacity, which enables it to
accept and modify imported technology so as to internalize this technology
into its domestic production. Technology is one of the most important
determinants of productivity and economic development. New dynamic
competitive advantage can be created through technology transfer and
conscious investment in R&D.
Technology not only possesses an expanding role in international trade,
foreign investment and international knowledge diffusion; domestic
production and productivity also depend on R&D activities. With more
internationalizing trade, business, and technology, the WTO will promote
the world economy toward globalized markets, more consolidation and
greater efficiency in production. That is, national boundaries signify much
less than they used to in terms of the flow of technology. The WTO,
established on January 1, 1995, is the legal and institutional foundation of
the multilateral trading system. It provides the principal contractual
obligations determining how governments frame and implement domestic
trade legislation and regulations.
The Uruguay Round (UR) negotiations tackled a broad range of issues
including investment, IPR and the enforcement of GATT regulations. The
agreement covers patents, copyrights, computer programs, databases,
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semiconductor chips, layout designs of integrated circuits and business
proprietary information. While IPR were formerly protected only bilaterally,
this agreement standardizes IPR protection. The agreement makes
unauthorized copying of foreign computer programs illegal. Korea has to
rewrite laws and regulations to make them compatible with the new
provision of the UR accord as well as WTO’s revision. Thus industries and
occupations related to IPR have to change the way they do business
accordingly. 
The WTO agreement on information technology, approved in December
1996, is considered significant in both its key role and in the dynamic
expansion of the world economy. The WTO Singapore Agreement, which
may well be a role model for other IPR negotiations, also involves some
concessions offered in negotiations leading to the establishment of
schedules annexed to the Marrakesh protocol. The Agreement could be a
pace setter for forthcoming negotiations of trade-related industrial property
rights and technologies.3
As a member of the WTO and the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), Korea has to comply with the new
regulations and rules of the WTO and OECD by reevaluating and rewriting
its laws and regulations on both formal and informal technology transfer.
Formal transfer involves direct foreign investment associated with
technology transfer, technology licensing, and capital goods. Informal
transfer includes foreign training and studies and reverse engineering from
imported products. Korea evolves its own research and development
institutions. The formulation of the science and technology policy has been
undertaken for the national R&D program, as the Korean government has
changed the direction of science and technology policy during the 1990s
(See Tables 1 and 2).
Korea’s globalization should not only focus on international competition,
but also direct the revitalization of domestic regional economies. Subsidies
are not allowed for industrial restructuring and environmental control, but
Korea can liberally provide for research and development under the WTO’s
rules. 
High-tech friction in international trade and investment arise from two
main sources: the international spillover from domestic policies designed to
enhance the technological capabilities of home-based firms (including
policies designed to increase technology inflows and decrease outflows) and
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3 As a reference, the patent agreement requires that 20-year patent protection be available
for all inventions, whether of products or processes, in almost all fields of technology.
policies targeted at opening foreign markets for multinational enterprises
(MNEs).4
There is a source of systemic friction in the Korean context. This is so for
two reasons: the far greater diversity of culture, language, institutional
governance and legal arrangements, and the increasing importance of
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TABLE 1. R&D EXPENDITURES
R&D Expenditure Financed by Gov’t R&D Expenditure Number of
(million $) Funds(%) to GNP (%) Researchers (persons)
Korea 1980 465 64.0 0.77 18,434
1992 6,224 17.6 2.17 88,764
U.S. 1980 62,582 41.7 2.29 651,200
1992 157,400 43.3 2.60 949,200*
Japan 1980 20,657 25.8 1.95 302,585
1992 94,426 16.8 2.80 504,966
Taiwan 1980 293 60.4 0.71 13,656
1992 3,049 52.0 1.70 46,173
Source: Ministry of Science and Technology (Korea); Taiwan Statistical Data Bureau; and Korea
Foreign Trade Association.
Note: *1988
TABLE 2. R&D EXPENDITURES IN KOREA
R&D Expenditure Share Research Researchers
R&D/GNP Government Private Organizations (persons)
(%) (%) (%) (number)
1981 0.81 55 45 662 20,718
1982 0.88 50 50 860 28,448
1983 1.01 34 66 1,080 32,117
1984 1.19 28 72 1,143 37,103
1985 1.48 25 75 1,291 41,473
1986 1.77 23 77 1,682 47,042
1987 1.87 25 75 1,864 52,783
1988 1.94 21 79 2,018 56,545
1989 1.99 20 80 2,077 66,220
1990 1.95 19 81 2,155 70,753
1991 2.01 20 80 2,351 76,252
1992 2.17 18 82 3,106 86,764
Source: Ministry of Science and Technology (Korea), Science and Technology Annual 1993 (in Korean),
p. 53; and Korea Foreign Trade Association, Korea and the World Key Indicators 1994, p. 58.
4 On both these fronts, American policymaking has played a leading role and will continue
to do so, whether in the WTO or other fora such as APEC and the OECD.
technology transfer to improve productivity growth. As the recent debate
about the nature of the East Asian Miracle suggests, there are limits to
growth which is largely driven by increased investment in physical and
human capital and technology catch-up.5 As the catch-up gap narrows,
changes in both domestic and international policy strategies will be
required and they may be more difficult today than they were in the
industrialization decades (1962-1994), prior to membership in the WTO and
OECD.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND COPYRIGHT ISSUES
The WTO seeks to ensure that adequate standards of intellectual property
protection exist in all member countries, taking as a starting point the
substantive obligations of the main pre-existing conventions of the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)—namely, the Paris Convention
for the Protection of Industrial Property and the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (copyright). The WTO has placed a
significant number of new or higher standards where the existing
conventions were silent or thought to be inadequate.
The WTO extends and clarifies previous GATT rules that laid down the
basis on which the government could impose compensating duties on two
forms of unfair competition. The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) recognizes that widely
varying standards in the protection and enforcement of intellectual property
rights and the lack of multilateral discipline dealing with international trade
in counterfeit goods have been a growing source of tension in international
economic relations. With that in mind, the agreement includes the
applicability of basic GATT principles and those of relevant international
intellectual property agreements; the provision of adequate protection of
intellectual property rights (IPR); the provision of effective enforcement
measures for those rights; multilateral dispute settlement; and transitional
implementation arrangements.
IPR can be defined as the acknowledgment of the right to financial
compensation for a certain period of time for the creation or development of
intellectual properties of economic value. The WTO has been seeking
adequate international protection of emerging technologies, computer
programs, integrated circuits, databases, etc. The importance of technology
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diffusion and intellectual property rights demands better understanding of
WTO technology policy. Trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights,
and trade-related investment measures, are subjects that have never been
negotiated in past GATT conferences. Intellectual property rights refer to
exclusive use of the property in question (technology, products, printed
materials). Intellectual property rights are granted to individuals and
business firms by national governments for designated periods of time.
Their purpose is to encourage invention, discovery, and innovation.
Negotiation issues include the adequacy of existing protection afforded
intellectual property rights; the enforcement of those rights by national
governments, including action against counterfeit goods; and the abuse of
industrial property rights for the purpose of restraining legitimate trade. 
Korea IPR protection has been consolidated and adapted to the changing
international environment.6 The Patent Act is designed to promote the
development of technology and contribute to industrial development by
protecting and encouraging invention and its application. The Korean
Copyright Act similarly contributes to the promotion of fair use of
copyrighted works by protecting authors’ rights and related rights.
Furthermore, Korea has gradually liberalized its technology transfer
policy along with foreign direct investment (FDI), and foreign licensing has
been opened to all industries and for all terms and conditions. Over 60
percent of total FDI and 71 percent of royalty payments in foreign licenses
since 1962 took place in 1987-91, resulting from Korea’s liberalizing policy
(See Table 3). In 1996 the new provisions included the Korea Trademark Act
and new Fair Trade Commission Guideline, and the revision of various
other Korean laws related to intellectual property rights have also been
passed in the Korean National Assembly in 1997 in order to accommodate
the WTO/TRIPS Agreement.
Korea welcomes AICs firms in Korea’s telecommunications sector along
with Korean private companies within the agreement reached during the
WTO talks. The government intends to reduce monopolization and promote
small and medium-sized enterprise in this sector. The government will
deregulate the industry, but at the same time monitor these companies to
see that there is fair competition with equal access to resources and
information.
Moreover, market presence is a two-way channel for both technology
diffusion and technology access. Most importantly, impediments to effective
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access are no longer confined to overt border barriers to trade or explicit
restrictions which limit foreign investment. Rather, impediments to effective
access can often arise from domestic regulatory policies, legal practices or
private sector actions which have an exclusionary effect by accident or
design.
MOVING TRADE TO HIGH-TECH ITEMS
Korea has moved to high-technology (See Table 4) and has accelerated
toward high technology which changes the nature of tasks implementing
technology, the interconnections and nature of physical, energy, and
information flows, the skills required, the management and coordination,
and the organizational culture along with technological progress. The
government has undertaken its new R&D policy under the name of the
108 KOREA JOURNAL OF POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT
TABLE 3. FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER TO KOREA (million $)
Source 1962-66 1967-71 1972-76 1977-81 1982-86 1987-91 Total
Foreign Licensing
U.S. 0.6 7.8 21.3 159.2 602.7 2,121.9 2,913.5
Japan – 5.0 58.7 139.8 323.7 1,483.9 1,991.1
All Others 0.2 3.5 16.6 152.4 258.5 853.6 1,284.7
Total 0.8 16.3 96.5 451.4 1,184.9 4,359.4 6,109.3
Technical Consultancy
U.S. – 3.1 6.0 16.7 159.1 619.8 804.7
Japan – 12.1 7.7 20.8 89.2 217.6 347.4
All Others – 1.6 4.8 17.2 84.0 413.5 521.1
Total – 16.8 18.5 54.7 332.3 1,250.9 1,673.2
Direct Foreign Investment
U.S. 25.0 95.3 135.0 235.7 581.6 1,482.1 2,554.7
Japan 8.3 89.7 627.1 300.9 875.2 2,113.6 4,014.8
All Others 12.1 33.6 117.3 184.0 309.7 2,036.1 2,694.8
Total 45.4 218.6 879.4 720.6 1,766.5 5,631.8 9,264.3
Capital Goods Imports
U.S. 75 472 1,973 6,219 12,394 33,099 54,232
Japan 148 1,292 4,423 14,269 20,986 54,643 95,761
All Others 93 777 2,445 7,490 17,205 33,197 61,207
Total 316 2,541 8,841 27,978 50,585 120,939 211,200
Source: For foreign licensing and direct foreign investment, Korea Industrial Technology
Association; For technical consultancy, Korea Engineering Service Association; For capital
goods imports, Korean Society for Advancement of Machinery Industry. See Linsu Kim,
“Absorptive Capacity and Industrial Growth: A Conceptual Framework and Korea’s
Experience,” Institute Reports, East Asian Institute, Columbia University, March 1993, p. 11.
highly advanced national (HAN) project, and this policy is an evolutionary
step from its previous approach.7 The HAN approach concerns the public
means for nurturing research institutions which can facilitate the
aggregation of capabilities, facilities, knowledge, and organization (See
Table 5). 
The policy requires, therefore, the setting of a long-term national goal and
pursuit of R&D by utilizing nonprofit research institutions, along with
taking into account resource availability, research agenda, socioeconomic
systems, and global technological trends. To meet growing requirements for
high technology, the government introduced various new devices and
incentives for product-oriented technologies8 and fundamental
technologies.9 Thus this project serves to monitor developments outside of
the industry and move quickly to introduce high-quality, lower-cost
modifications and designs of products of technologies introduced
elsewhere.
Korea’s consumer electronics giants are trying to transform themselves
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TABLE 4. WORLD MARKET SHARE (%) OF EXPORTS IN SELECTED HIGH-TECH INDUSTRY
(1990)
Top Ten Exporters Microelectronics Computers Telecom Equipment
Ranking (country/%) (country/%) (country/%)
1 U.S./27.5 U.S./24.2 Japan/28.4
2 Japan/21.7 Japan/17.3 U.S./15.9
3 Malaysia/7.2 U.K./8.7 Sweden/6.9
4 Korea/6.7 Germany/6.6 Germany/6.5
5 Germany/4.0 Taiwan/6.3 Canada/4.7
6 Taiwan/3.8 Singapore/6.1 Taiwan/3.9
7 Singapore/3.6 Netherlands/4.2 Korea/3.4
8 U.K./3.5 France/4.0 Netherlands/3.3
9 France/2.7 Italy/3.3 France/3.1
10 Canada/2.3 Korea/2.5 U.K./3.1
Source: CIA, Economic Statistics, cited in Korea Foreign Trade Association, Korea and the World Key
Indicators 1994, p. 118.
7 Under the previous approach, the criticism was that researchers lacked strategic direction
of research proposals and clear-cut objectives, for example.
8 The product-oriented technologies are as follows: 1) highly integrated semiconductors; 2)
integrated services and data networks; 3) high definition TV; 4) new medicine and
agricultural chemicals; and 5) advanced production systems.
9 The fundamental technologies are as follows: 1) new materials in information service,
electronics, and energy; 2) next generation transportation system including machines and
parts; 3) new functional biomaterial; 4) environmental engineering; 5) new energy resources;
and 6) new atomic reactor and verification.
into a global force in the expanding field of multimedia appliances, which
combine features of personal computers with consumer electronics. In their
boldest moves to date, Korean companies have snapped up control of two
US electronic firms—Zenith Electronics and AST Research — and are
spending heavily trying to make them international stars. LG Electronics
acquired control of Zenith in 1995. As part of its takeover plan, LG agreed to
invest $350 million to modernize Zenith’s picture tubes for computer
monitors, and build a plant to make those big picture tubes. Despite
vigorous turnaround efforts, AST has required several transfusions of cash
and credit from Samsung. In July 1996, Samsung invested $60 million,
raising its stake to about 46 percent. One encouraging sign is that AST has
been gaining both market share and glowing reviews in computer
magazines for a new product line that offers leading-edge technology at
bargain-basement prices.10
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TABLE 5. HAN PROJECT: FUNDAMENTAL TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
Projects Objective
Development of ultra-large-scale Development and production of 256 Mega DRAM by 1996
integrated circuits (ULSI) Development of 1 giga DRAM by 2000
Development of new advanced Development of high value-added new materials
materials for the information, and synthesis of ultra-pure raw materials that are
electronics, and energy industries important for the information industry and a highly
developed industrial society
Development of advanced manufacturing Development of computer-integrated manufacturing
systems (CIM) by 1996
R&D on intelligent manufacturing system (IMS) by 2000
Development of new functional bio-materials Development of high quality and high productivity
biological resources expected to be important in
21st century industries but now in the early stage
Development of environmental technology Upgrading technology to solve national and global 
environmental problems and to provide a better human 
and social environment, as part of cooperation for global 
environmental protection and conservation
Development of new energy technology Development of highly efficient and clean energy; 
contribution to highly developed industry and society
R&D on next-generation nuclear reactor Design and verification study for a new reactor concept; 
securing stable energy resources in preparation for the 
exhaustion of fossil energy
Source: MOST, cited in OECD, Reviews of National Science and Technology Policy: Republic of Korea,
1996, p. 74.
Furthermore, Korea is still importing aircraft, but has rapidly improved in
developing related parts and components. The most imminent problem is
for Korea to develop core technology for designs, tests and appraisals, and
maintenance. Korea was expected to record 900 billion won (approximately
$1 billion) in sales of aircraft in 1996, a 28 percent increase from 1995. 
Samsung Aerospace’s new Sachon plant of fuselage sections for the F-16
in the Korean Fighter Program (KFP) was completed. With the KFP
program, Korea’s 3,500-member aerospace workforce has graduated to the
integration of major aircraft systems. The next big step could come from the
military with production of the KTX-2 advanced trainer-light combat
aircraft, or it could come from the commercial side with regional transport
lines. Opportunities may also exist in space manufacturing. The KFP
program has helped to advance Samsung’s production techniques and
management style.11
Korea has been increasing investment in new technology and equipment,
and initiated a drive for higher quality to meet the current competitive
challenges. The aggregate foreign investment in Korea since 1962 totaled
$11.2 billion at the end of 1993. New foreign investment in Korea amounted
to $1.04 billion in 279 cases in 1993, a 16 percent increase from $894 million
in 1992. By industry, $527 million of 1993’s foreign investment was made in
the manufacturing sector and $517 million in the service sector. Under the
World Trade Organization (WTO) system, there will be greater investment
in Korea by foreign countries, especially the U.S., as Korea gears up to
globalize its economy, including a significant liberalization of restraints on
investment.
Technological cooperation between Korea and the U.S. can overcome such
constraints and realize mutual gains from technological cooperation. If the
two countries are to make the most of their opportunities and reduce their
trade deficits with Japan, it would be desirable that they develop economic
policies which stress mutual comparative advantages of technologies. 
Korea’s vision of becoming an advanced information society is expected
to give impetus to the progressive opening of its communications industries
and the development of a fairer regulatory network. It has also led to a
drive to improve the country’s technological infrastructure and to
strengthen the competitiveness of its information industries and overall
national technological capacity. Given the country’s need for technology
TECHNOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT: 111
10 See Kaar, Louis, “Guess Who’s Betting on America’s High-Tech Losers,” Fortune, Vol. 134,
No. 8, pp. 53-56.
11 See Aviation Week & Space Technology, Vol. 145, No. 18, October 28, 1996, pp. 26-27.
transfer and know-how, this drive is expected to generate market openings
and opportunities for foreign high-tech firms. The Korean government has
been implementing the plan to build an information superhighway. The
project is expected to be completed by 2015 and to cost an estimated $58
billion.12
The rapid spread of information technology is turning the struggle to
seize the competitive high ground into a global free-for-all, and Asia’s sky is
considered the brightest area in information technology. The region
represents the World’s fastest-growing economies, including the largely
untapped markets of China and India. Being established technologically,
Korea has recently begun pushing its way into new markets in the region.
Its national information plan includes 13 kinds of new economy-
information databases, electronic libraries and museums, and information
superhighway access in schools.
Korea Mobile Telecom and Shinsegi Telecom launched commercial code
division multiple access (CDMA) digital cellular service in Korea in 1996.
The Korean government’s wholesale commitment to CDMA has become the
foundation for a thriving development and manufacturing program,
putting local high-tech companies such as Hyundai, Samsung, and LG
among the world’s leading producers of system and infrastructure and
handsets, and leaving them poised to exploit export markets.13
Furthermore, Samsung Electronics’s massive production increased so that
in 1996 it will add up to a $2.07 billion total investment by all 3
manufacturers. Samsung has invested $308 million in its active matrix LCD
line. By October, the company will achieve a monthly capacity of 180,000
10.4-inch screens.14
Korea should actively seek AICs’ investments, the U.S.’ in particular, as
partners to facilitate joint ventures of R&D and production, and engage in
fields like HDTVs, next generation automobiles and semiconductors, and
new materials for the purpose of formulating a technological and industrial
alliance, alleviating the trade deficits the two countries are suffering from,
and preventing the deterioration of their competitiveness.
DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGY AND THIRD PARTY TRANSFERS
Worldwide sales of foreign affiliates in host countries in 1992 amounted to
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13 See Telecommunications, Vol. 30, No. 12, December 1996, p. 12, 17.
14 See Guth, Rob, “LCD Screens Are on the Way,” Infoworld, Vol. 18, July 15, 1996, p. 26.
$5.2 trillion, nearly twice the value of world exports of goods and services,
and considerably more than twice their value in 1984, demonstrating the
magnitude of the changing global economy.15 There are a number of reasons
why technology issues have featured more prominently in the international
agenda over the past decade and a half. Perhaps the most fundamental was
the emergence by the end of the 1970s of the ‘convergence club’ of the
OECD countries, i.e., convergence in technological and managerial
capabilities, capital intensity, and education levels. This convergence was
largely a result of “catch-up.” The main driver of catch-up was the diffusion
of the advanced technology of the US, the undisputed postwar leader.
The U.S. advantage in technology lies in the production of high-
technology capital goods and consumer goods, and evidence is strong that
this advantage has been growing. High-tech industries have shown
distinctive features. Their costs fall rapidly as production builds up, mainly
due to economies of scale, the learning curve and technological innovation.
And these leading-edge industries get replaced fairly frequently, mainly
because of short product life cycles. 
U.S. industries are overwhelmingly successful in big system software,
computer, aerospace, basic science, telecommunications, and new product
design, areas where the U.S. can meet Japan’s industrial challenge head on
and thus can improve the bilateral trade balance. America has a broad
business, university and government technological base, and an overall
environment conducive to basic research and development. It leads the
world in high-tech areas.16
The U.S. has a huge financial capacity as well as technological
advantages, whereas Korea has limited endowments of these factors;
however, it has a disciplined, high quality work force and a proven record
as a shrewd trader in the world market, producing quality products at low
cost.
The convergence was greatly facilitated by the reduction of barriers to
trade and financial flows promoted by postwar international institutions. So
one source of the technology focus of the 1980s was rising concern in the US
over challenges to American technological preeminence in both medium-
tech (capital-intensive sectors such as autos and technology-intensive
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for the Global Trade and Financial System, edited by Il SaKong, Seoul: Institute for Global
Economics, 1997, p. 62; see also UNCTAD, Division of Transnational Corporations and
Investment Estimates, World Investment Report 1995, p. 37.
16 See Kim, Youn-Suk, “Prospects for Japanese-U.S. Trade and Industrial Competition,”
Asian Survey, May 1990, pp. 498-503.
components and equipment) and high-tech industries.
In the Post-Cold war era, the U.S. has successfully implemented its dual-
use technology program. The United States has established the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), which has a $2 billion
budget with $500 million in defense conversion programs in areas of
regional technology alliance, agile manufacturing and dual-use critical
technology partnerships.17 It is the model for a proposed new commercial
technological facility.18 This agency has influenced many commercially
successful innovations ranging from packet-switched telecommunications
to artificial intelligence. The agency is a catalyst in strengthening American
companies such as Sun Microsystems, Inc., the leading computer
workstation maker since the 1970s. 
DARPA involves commercial ventures just like those of Japan’s MITI
Agency of Industrial Science and Technology, and it even has an office in
Tokyo for facilitating its access to Japan’s new technology. DARPA
supported microchip fabrication such as the Very High Speed Integrated
Circuits program, and the spin-off of the program has resulted in
development of the high-resolution X-ray lithography systems needed to
produce the next-generation computer memory chips. In 1992, DARPA
initiated a high-definition display manufacturing consortium to cope with
Japan’s lead in the manufacture of thin electronic screens, commercial
display systems, and high definition TV.
Unlike America’s application, Korea’s dual-use technology presents a
different approach. Major conglomerates (Chaebol) of Korea set up outposts
in Silicon Valley to leapfrog into state-of-the-art technologies by monitoring
technology trends. Locating in Silicon Valley gave another advantage to
Chaebol: availability of top-notch Korean-American scientists and
engineers. These outposts also serve as antennae for information on
research activities and as training posts for scientists and engineers from
Korea (See Table 6). 
Chaebol have also organized strategic intelligence systems to gather
information from sources both inside and outside the enterprise. Chaebol
increased ties with multinationals to develop capability in high technology.
In these strategic alliances, multinationals provide basic design while
Korean firms supply manufacturing process technology, for which Korean
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17 Reliance on DARPA for development of dual-use, see U.S. Advanced Research Project
Agency (ARPA), Project Level Summary Report, 1993.
18 See Kim, Youn-Suk, “Technology Policies in Japan and the U.S.: Implications for Korea,”
The US-Korea Economic Partnership, eidted by Youn-Suk Kim and Kap-Soo Oh, Hants GU11
3HR, England: Avebury Publishing, Ltd., 1995, pp. 237-239.
firms have the competitive edge.
There is rising competition over technology development in the world.
Korea is no exception. Development of new and applied technology will
contribute to innovating production and improving productivity. There is
development work under study in all industrial sectors of Korea. The most
important diffusion mechanism has been the mobility of experienced
managerial and technical personnel between enterprises. Two-thirds of the
new enterprises in the consumer electronic industry during the 1960s and
1970s acquired production and production design capability by luring
experienced technical personnel from existing enterprises.
While some technologies are available at low cost, many are expensive
and subject to tight control. The ability to make use of imported technology
depends on a country’s absorptive capacity and strategic intelligence, which
enable it to adapt and modify imported technology so as to internalize this
technology into its domestic production. Technology is one of the most
TECHNOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT: 115
TABLE 6. OVERSEAS RESEARCH CENTERS OF KOREAN FIRM AS OF OCTOBER 1994
Parent Firm Country R&D Personnel Year Established
LG Electronics Tokyo, Japan 25 1981
Kumho Tire Akron, OH, U.S. 8 1991
Kia Motors Detroit, MI, U.S. 8 1991
Kia Motors Tokyo, Japan 18 1992
Dong-Ah Construction London, U.K. 5 1993
Daewoo Automobile Worthing, U.K. 300 1994
Daewoo Electronics Metz Technopole, France 7 1994
Daewoo Electronics Paris, France 4 1994
Maxon Electronics Kansas City, MO, U.S. 30 1981
Samsung Electron Devices Berlin, Germany 6 1994
Samsung Electro-Mechanics Byungsong, Japan 6 1991
Samsung Electronics Tokyo, Japan 8 1987
Samsung Electronics Osaka, Japan 8 1990
Samsung Electronics Surrey, U.K. 5 1994
Samsung Electronics Moscow, Russia 22 1994
Samsung Electronics London, U.K. 6 1994
Young Chang Akki Boston, MA, U.S. 20 1991
Yukong Fairfield, NJ, U.S. 16 1990
Cosmo Laser New York, NY, U.S. 5 1994
Hankook Tire Akron, OH, U.S. 14 1992
Hyundai Motor Tokyo, Japan 5 1985
Hyundai Motor Frankfurt, Germany n.a. n.a.
n.a.: Not available
Source: STEPI, 1995, cited in OECD, Reviews of National Science and Technology Policy: Republic of
Korea, 1996, p. 118.
important determinants of productivity and international competition. New
dynamic comparative advantage can be created through technology transfer
and conscious investment in R&D. 
Technological innovation is the process of realizing new production
functions and new products, and it includes technical research,
development, production start-up and improvements, and market
information. Innovation affects foreign trade through higher factor
productivity, changing production functions, and new products, producing
more goods with the same inputs or producing the same quantity of
outputs with less inputs. 
EXPORTING INDUSTRIES ABROAD, ESPECIALLY TO CHINA
Criticism of imported technology from AICs has centered on the problem
of absorption, since most developing countries (DCs) are unprepared to
accommodate the modern technology of AICs. The technology of AICs
tends to be physical-capital-abundant and human-capital-abundant in
design. DCs need a different type of technology, because they tend to have
abundant unskilled labor and little physical or human capital. The
appropriate technology in such a situation is labor-intensive, and small-
scale technology can play a role as a catalyst in international technological
transfer between AICs and DCs.19
The major characteristics of Korean imported technology are its
modification and adaptation; the country has developed its own way of
using technology and capital goods, so-called indigenous production
engineering. Machinery and technological application have been handled in
simpler ways than originally designed, since workers were poorly equipped
with skills. As long as the simpler way of doing a thing has resulted in the
desired production with higher value added, not only have output goals
been reached, but Korean management and workers have gained
confidence and have themselves undertaken further improvement and
adaptation of imported technology. Korea is providing DCs with
technologies and industries suitable to their factor endowments and to their
workers’s skills in particular. 
World competition is a powerful force for making Korea venture into the
close linkage of trade and technology. Korea now has to accommodate its
industrial workforce with higher wages, and at the same time compete in
116 KOREA JOURNAL OF POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT
19 See Kim, Youn-Suk, “Managing Technological Transfer with Korea as a Catalyst,” Human
Systems Management, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1989, pp. 21-223.
world markets and upgrade its industrial structure so as to produce high
value-added products, while graduating from its traditional labor-intensive
industries. Korea’s obsolete machinery has been exported to Asian DCs
such as China, for producing in local markets and for training workers
employed in their export-oriented industries. 
Technology can provide Korea with a ”strategic bargaining currency” for
expansion and trade-linked investment with Asian DCs (See Table 7). 
Given that Korea has been able to develop the information sectors as
strategic industries to reach international competitiveness, it can be a
catalyst between AICs and DCs. A 150,000-metric-ton-per-year vinyl acetate
monomer plant has been brought on stream at Ulsan, Korea, by a 3-way
joint venture of BP chemicals, Union Carbide Corp. and the Samsung
Group. The venture has undertaken a 100,000 ton acetic acid plant with BP
technology under construction at Shanghai, China. 
Utilizing its cheap labor and land, China is being transformed into the
world’s emerging manufacturing center. On the basis of purchasing parity,
the World Bank has already announced that China is one of the world’s
economic giants, with a per capita GDP amounting to $2,460 and GDP of
$2,890 billion. China has achieved so much since it adopted the policy of
reform and openness by bringing a portion of the population, the 260
million people in coastal areas along the Yellow River and the Southeast
China Sea, into the market-oriented economy.
Korea’s trade with Southeast Asian countries and China could be
significant to the U.S. interest. Korea’s economy complements in many ways
that of the US.. America could capitalize on its close ties with Korea and
move into Asian markets in association with this partnership. 
In Asian DCs, Korea competes successfully against local firms and against
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TABLE 7. KOREA’S TECHNOLOGY EXPORTS BY COUNTRY AND INDUSTRY, 1978-94
(million $)
China Indonesia PhilippinesIndia MalaysiaThailand DAEs OECD (U.S.) (Japan) Other Total
Electronics 24 5 7 12 5 7 2 14 3 2 31 107 (19.9)
Petro-chemical 22 21 4 6 6 7 5 15 3 5 13 99 (18.4)
Machinery 37 8 6 12 7 2 3 1 – – 9 85 (15.8)
Textiles 21 4 15 5 1 1 1 1 – – 9 58 (10.8)
Other 49 20 14 10 14 5 10 19 1 10 48 189 (35.1)
Total 153 58 46 45 33 22 21 50 7 17 110 538(100.0)
(28.4) (10.8) (8.6) (8.4) (6.1) (4.1) (3.9) (9.3) (1.3) (3.2) (20.4) (100.0)
Source: KITA, cited in OECD, Reviews of National Science and Technology Policy: Republic of Korea,
1996, p. 89.
some of Japan’s multinational enterprises. Korean managers are in high
demand due to shortages of supervisors in Asian DCs.
As Korea has moved to high value-added industries, low level labor-
intensive industries have been shifted to DCs. This is an interesting example
of technological transfer with Korea being the catalyst. It is now quite
evident that a new economic trend is appearing, as Korean investment
moves to DCs, where it competes successfully against local firms and
multinational enterprises of AICs. The series will continue as long as AICs
continue to funnel their technologies to newly industrialized countries
(NICs), and NICs to DCs. 
The cost of the production of Korean firms is usually low because of their
use of appropriate technologies, and they are able to provide goods and
services at prices below those of other multinationals or locally owned
firms. Korean direct investment with its associated technology is considered
to be largely aimed at production cost reduction; Korean investment is
utilizing the abundant labor supplies and supplies of lumber, limestone and
other raw materials of DCs so as to reduce the cost of products for domestic
consumption as well as export. In other words, the countries which possess
primary commodities and abundant labor have attracted Korean investors
with their technology in export-oriented industries. 
CONCLUSION
Having realized a successful industrialization, Korea has now to cope
with competition from AICs with more efficient industries as well as from
developing countries with lower labor costs. As a logistic, therefore, Korea
has to cultivate its own science and technology, complemented by more
Korean scientists trained abroad, and already returning scientists and
engineers who have helped narrow the gap between Korea and AICs in
high technologies. Incidentally, government support of big business has
resulted in increasing domination of manufacturing by Chaebol. Chaebol
are responding to the current competitive crisis in two ways: increased
investment in new technology and new equipment. Chaebol expanded their
in-house R&D capacity, and they are poised to develop key high-tech
industries.
In the 1980s, government abolished all industry-specific promotion acts,
and instead enacted a new industrial promotion act that ties incentives with
specific industrial activities such as R&D and human resource development.
Korea now faces formidable challenges in science and technology. Because
of Korea’s rising labor costs, China and Southeast Asian countries have
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become competitive in labor-intensive industrial exports, and other more
advanced NICs such as Taiwan and Spain present stiffer competition in the
world market. Korea is seriously hampered from obtaining technology from
AICs. Fearful of boomerang effects, AICs are reluctant to transfer
technology to Korea which finds itself at the crossroads on the cutting edge
of technology. Yet at the same time its big industries pose a major threat of
inflexibility. Chaebol are unable to respond quickly to changes in AICs
markets due to scale constraints in existing operating facilities. 
In short, Korea faces problems of meeting competition from countries
with more efficient industries as well as those with lower labor costs. Korea
is now finding it increasingly difficult to rely on imported technology for
product innovation and process technologies, which it must have in order to
meet challenges in global competition under WTO and OECD regimes.
Korea must muster the human capital, financial and other resources for
domestic R&D to maintain a continued industrial growth path,
complemented by imported technology. Korea has to promote its own
technological innovation with R&D efforts that are essential in meeting the
constraints imposed on it in the changing global economy.
Yet, whatever problems arise, Korea must recognize that technological
capability is the major source of its international competitiveness. Granted
that Korea’s industrial technology has been developed from imported
technology, the major feature of technological policy was the fostering of
indigenous technology through research centers established in both public
and private sectors. 
As technology has been recognized as the driver of productivity and
economic performance, the Korean government changed the direction of
science and technology policy at the beginning of the 1990s. This
recognition of technology stems from its fuller impact on the Korean
economy. Korea must continue to push its R&D in realizing the HAN
approach as its technological progression path. In pursuing its technology
policy, Korea must seriously heed WTO rules concerning IPR, as the HAN
program moves trade toward high technology along with mid-technology
application.
Moreover, in this Post Cold war-world, Korea has to take into account
dual-use technology with third party transfers, so as to realize strategic
intelligence as well as strategic trade policy. Korean firms have successfully
involved themselves in exporting industries and technologies abroad,
especially in China and Asian DCs. Korea should continue to expand its
trade and industries to those countries so as to realize their development as
well as Korea’s international competitiveness.
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